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ANTITRUST AND DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY FROM GERMAN FASCISM 
Daniel A. Crane† 
 
Nearly forty years ago, Bob Pitofsky wrote, in his classic article The Political 
Content of Antitrust, that it is “bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude 
certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws.”1 Pitofsky argued that 
pervasive monopoly threatened democratic values in three ways:  “[F]irst, . . . 
excessive concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political 
pressures . . [S]econd, . . . individual and business freedom [can be enhanced] 
by reducing the range within which private discretion by a few in the economic 
sphere controls the welfare of all . . . [Third] if the free-market sector of the 
economy is allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but 
economic concerns, the likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few 
corporate giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more 
intrusive role in economic affairs.”2 
Over the last few decades, Pitofsky’s concerns about the democracy-
corroding effects of corporate consolidation have garnered occasional academic 
mention, but have largely taken a back seat to an antitrust policy focused on 
economic efficiency and consumer welfare. But there are growing signs that, in 
the nascent challenge to the reigning consumer welfare regime, concerns over 
monopoly’s effects on democracy may come again to the fore.  Since at least the 
last election cycle, voices on the Democrats’ progressive wing like Senator 
Elizabeth Warren have been warning that “[c]oncentration threatens our 
markets, threatens our economy, and threatens our democracy.”3 The influential 
Open Markets Institute argues that the Progressive obsession with the Supreme 
Court’s Citizen United4 decision ignores the equally anti-democratic effects of 
corporate consolidation brought about by lax antitrust.5 The critique has 
migrated to the political center, with the Congressional Democrats asserting that 
                                              
 † Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.  Earlier versions of this 
paper were presented at the Tobin Project conference on institutions of democracy (May 2017) 
and the Association of American Law Schools 2018 Annual Meeting Antitrust Section panel.  
I am grateful for helpful comments from _______. 
1 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051, 1051 (1979). 
2 Id. 
3 Senator Elizabeth Warren Delivers Remarks on Reigniting Competition in the American 
Economy, June 29, 2016, https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1169; see 
also Brian Beutler, How Democrats Can Wage War on Monopolies—and Win, New Republic, 
Sept. 16, 2017, https://newrepublic.com/article/144675/democrats-elizabeth-warren-can-
wage-war-monopolies-and-win. 
4 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
5 Democracy & Monopoly, https://openmarketsinstitute.org/explainer/democracy-and-
monopoly/. 
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“concentrated economic power leads to concentrated political power.”6 Centrists 
policy groups like the Brookings Institution argue that stronger antitrust is 
necessary to prevent big tech firms from “wield[ing] excessive influence in our 
democracy.”7 On the right, President Trump wans that allowing deals like 
AT&T/Time Warner “destroy[s] democracy.”8  Even staunch defenders of the 
consumer welfare standard, like Republican Senator Orrin Hatch, have recently 
trumpeted the importance of antitrust as a political institution—“the magna 
carta of the free enterprise system” and “the capitalist’s answer to the siren song 
of the central planner.”9  Along the broad political continuum, there appears to 
be a consensus forming—at least a rhetorical one—that antitrust is an important 
institution of democracy, not merely a tool for extracting lower prices for 
consumers.  At this potentially generative moment in antitrust history, 
antitrust’s relationship to democracy is back on the table for reexamination. 
As it seeps back into popular discourse, the relationship between democracy 
and the anti-monopoly tradition deserves a comprehensive examination—a task 
on which I am just now embarking.  As a first step, I propose to return to a 
central concern of Pitofsky’s article—the historical relationship between 
monopoly and mid-twentieth century fascism.  The case of German (and to 
perhaps a lesser extent Japanese) fascism provides an important starting point 
for this analysis.  The role of concentrated economic power in supporting the 
Nazi regime served as a prime motivating factor for the post-War antitrust 
regimes in the United States and Europe—the Celler-Kefauver anti-merger 
regime in the United States and Ordoliberalism in Europe.  More broadly, the 
history of German industrial consolidation in the early twentieth century and 
the subsequent role of large industry in enabling Hitler’s rise to power provide a 
fertile record on which to ask an important set of questions, particularly: (1) How 
did industrial concentration give rise to fascism; (2) was the problem overly large 
industrial organizations (i..e., “the Curse of Bigness”) or rather organizations 
with excessive market power; and (3) what manner of antitrust regime would 
have been necessary and sufficient to prevent the unholy relationship between 
business and Nazism from developing? I interrogate these questions through a 
case study of the German industrial firm most squarely responsible for Hitler’s 
rise to power: the I.G. Farben chemical cartel. 
                                              
6 U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Leadership, A Better Deal:  Crack Down on Corporate 
Monopolies & the Abuse of Economic and Political Power, 
https://abetterdeal.democraticleader.gov/crack-down-on-abuse-of-power/  
7 Clara Hendrickson & William A. Galston, Big Technology firms challenge traditional assumptions 
about antitrust enforcement, Brookings Institution, December 6, 2017, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/12/06/big-technology-firms-challenge-
traditional-assumptions-about-antitrust-enforcement/. 
8 Trump’s comments create a lose-lose position for Justice, Washington Post (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-comments-create-a-lose-lose-position-
for-justice/2017/11/13/6fd7b28e-c596-11e7-aae0-
cb18a8c29c65_story.html?utm_term=.3fa9eb549b54. 
9 Hatch Speaks on Growing Controversy Over Antitrust Law in the Tech Sector, Aug. 3, 2017, 
https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ID=299BA71A-9DAB-45AC-
BC7C-0FABB967451C. 
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I. ANTITRUST’S ANTI-FASCIST TURN AND ITS DEMISE 
In the wake of the Second World War, both the United States and Europe 
embarked on programs of heightened antitrust enforcement.  Although the two 
regimes were subject to different influences and took different paths, they shared 
a common underlying concern about the role that economic concentration had 
played in the rise of fascism in Europe.  With the passage of time and the 
confluence of events, the anti-fascist strand of antitrust law has eroded—to the 
point of oblivion in the United States and near-oblivion in Europe.  Before digging 
deeper into the facts of industrial concentration and the rise of Nazism, it is 
worth recalling the way that anti-fascist rhetoric framed the post-War antitrust 
regimes and then receded over time. 
A. The Lost Concern of the Post-War Congress 
1. The Anti-Fascist Roots of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act 
Following World War II, Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, 
substantially expanding Section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914, which prohibits 
anticompetitive mergers.  At a technical level, Celler-Kefauver accomplished 
three things: (1) closing the “asset loophole,” which had allowed merging firms 
to escape Section 7’s coverage through asset rather than stock acquisitions; (2) 
deleting “acquiring-acquired” language in the original text of Section 7 that could 
be read to limit Section 7 to horizontal mergers and exclude coverage of vertical 
and conglomerate mergers; and (3) clarifying that Section 7 reached “incipient” 
trends toward increasing concentration levels which might threaten competition.  
In a more general sense, Celler-Kefauver served up a Congressional mandate for 
a post-War program of intensive anti-merger enforcement by the Justice 
Department and Federal Trade Commission from the 1950s through the early 
1970s to stem the perceived “rising tide of concentration” in the American 
economy.10 
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Brown Shoe, the Act’s legislative 
history reveals “Congress’ fear not only of accelerated concentration of economic 
power on economic grounds, but also of the threat to other values a trend toward 
concentration was thought to pose.”11  Although the Supreme Court did not 
specify what “other values” Congress perceived to be at stake, floor statements 
by the bill’s two primary sponsors—and New York Senator Emanuel Celler and 
Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver—reveal a preoccupation with the political 
consequences of concentrated economic power, particularly in the correlation 
between industrial cartelization and monopoly and the rise of fascism in pre-War 
Germany, and totalitarianism more broadly. Celler warned: 
 
                                              
10 Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962). 
11 Id. 
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I want to point out the danger of this trend toward more and 
better combines. I read from a report filed with former Secretary of 
War Royall as to the history of the cartelization and concentration of 
industry in Germany: 
Germany under the Nazi set-up built up a great series of 
industrial monopolies in steel, rubber, coal and other materials. The 
monopolies soon got control of Germany, brought Hitler to power 
and forced virtually the whole world into war. 
The report continues: 
A high degree of concentration throughout industry fosters the 
formation of cartels and readily enables a war-minded government 
to mobilize for hostilities. Such was the history of war preparations 
in Germany in both World War I and World War II.12 
 
Senator Kefauver seconded Celler’s anti-totalitarian themes.  The rising tide 
of concentration would lead to totalitarianism of either the fascist or Stalinist 
variety: 
 
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in 
other nations where mergers and concentrations have placed 
economic control in the hands of a very few people is too clear to 
pass over easily. A point is eventually reached, and we are rapidly 
reaching that point in this country, where the public steps in to take 
over when concentration and monopoly gain too much power. The 
taking over by the public through its government always follows one 
or two methods and has one or two political results. It either results 
in a Fascist state or the nationalization of industries and thereafter 
a Socialist or Communist state. Most businessmen realize this 
inevitable result. Certain monopolistic interests are being very 
short-sighted in not appreciating the plight to which they are forcing 
their Government.13 
 
Celler and Kefauver’s floor speeches reflected a broader concern of the U.S. 
Congress that industrial concentration facilitated the incubation of 
                                              
12 95 Cong. Rec. 11, 486 (1949).  Celler continued by quoting Walter Lippmann 
of Fortune magazine as follows: 
 
The development of combinations in business, which are able to dominate markets 
in which they sell their goods, and in which they buy their labor and materials, 
must lead irresistibly to some form of state collectivism. So much power will never 
for long be allowed to rest in private hands, and those who do not wish to take the 
road to the politically administered economy of socialism, must be prepared to take 
the steps back toward the restoration of the market economy of private competitive 
enterprise. 
 
13 96 Cong. Rec. 16,452 (1950). 
4
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 155 [2018]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/155
totalitarianism and threatened democracy.14  As discussed in greater below, an 
extensive set of War Department and Justice Department investigations into 
Weimar and pre-Weimar era industrial practices in Germany and their 
relationship to the Nazi regime undergirded these concerns.  The period of post-
war anti-merger enthusiasm, which lasted roughly from 1950 to the mid-1970s, 
thus reflected, at its core, a deep concern that industrial concentration 
threatened the democratic order. 
2. Post-War Anti-Merger Enthusiasm and Its Demise 
 
The Celler-Kefauver Act empowered the federal antitrust agencies to 
pursue an anti-merger agenda that included successful challenges to many 
mergers that posed little, if any, immediate threat of oligopolistic concentration.  
The federal courts largely rubber-stamped the agencies’ enforcement agenda in 
the 1950s through the mid-1970s, leading Justice Stewart famously to complain 
in dissent that “the sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under s 
7, the Government always wins.”15  
The period of enthusiastic merger-busting subsided in the mid-1970s as a 
result of two distinct forces.  One was the rise of the Chicago School of economic 
analysis, which had been mounting a critique of post-War antitrust since at least 
the 1950s and succeeded in conquering the Supreme Court by the late 1970s.  
The Supreme Court signaled a turn toward Chicago in one of its last major 
merger decisions of the 1970s, General Dynamics,16 shortly after which it got out 
of the merger business entirely.  The Court has not decided a merger case on the 
merits since 1976.   
And, not coincidentally. that was also the year of the second distinctive 
force that ended the era of enthusiastic merger-busting—the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Act which created a pre-merger notification system and effectively shifted merger 
review out of the courts and into the agencies, from an adjudicatory model to an 
administrative model.17  This completed Post-Hart-Scott merger control settled 
into a technocratic data-crunching exercise by professional economists more 
interested in the predictive power on prices and output from changes in the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index than the veiled specter of fascism. 
Chicago and Hart-Scott killed the aggressively anti-incipiency version of 
Celler and Kefauver’s project, but what happened to the concern with economic 
concentration leading to political concentration?  Many different forces, 
including dimming collective memory of the war, distrust of governmental 
institutions post-Watergate, and the rise of the consumerist movement had a 
hand in the demise of the anti-merger regime.  But one particular angle has the 
strongest explanatory power:  The anti-fascist political strain of Celler-Kefauver 
ideology coincided so neatly with the rising economic theory of anti-merger 
                                              
14 See generally Pitofsky, supra n. xxx (1979). 
15 U.S. v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 302 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
16 U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
17 Crane, Technocracy, supra n. xxx. 
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enforcement—structuralism—that the two lines became intermeshed and 
inseparable.  Then, when Chicago demolished structuralism empirically and 
theoretically to the point that even leading structuralists admitted error and 
moved on, structuralism pulled down anti-fascism in its collapse.  Anti-fascism 
was effectively subsumed in structuralism, and hence shared its fate. 
Few schools of antitrust thought have enjoyed such temporal success as 
the structuralist school, which came to become known as the Harvard School 
because of its association with Harvard professors Carl Kaysen, Donald Turner, 
and Phil Areeda and Joe Bain, a Harvard-trained economist who spent the bulk 
of his career at the University of California at Berkeley.18  Structuralim’s core 
and elegant tenet was that a strong, deterministic relationship exists between a 
market’s structure, conduct, and performance (thus giving rise to the Structure-
Conduct-Performance or just S-C-P paradigm).  Concentration was the most 
significant component of structure.  Thus, a highly concentrated market 
inexorably led to anticompetitive firm behavior, and such behavior inexorably led 
to poor market performance, expressed as higher prices and lower quality.  The 
upshot was that the government could directly attack concentrated market 
structures without worrying about the specific mechanisms (conduct) that led 
from that structure to poor market performance.19 
Structuralism prevailed in the academy, antitrust agencies, courts, and 
political institutions until the mid-1970s.  In late 1967, President Lyndon 
Johnson secretly asked Phil Neal, Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, 
to lead a commission of distinguished economists and lawyers to report on the 
state of competition in the United States and recommend potential changes to 
                                              
18  See generally Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 
127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1104 (1979); Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis:  
1890-1955, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 311, 350-354 (2009). 
19 At a theoretical level, structuralism rested on four broad theoretical and empirical 
propositions.  First, the structuralists assumed a strong link between the number of firms in 
a market and the propensity of prices to rise above cost.  This claim rested principally on 
strong assumptions, formalized by the nineteenth century French mathematician Augustin 
Cournot, that oligopoly behavior would increase as the number of firms decreased.  The 
structuralists claimed that the Cournot assumptions were borne out by empirical studies 
showing that firms in concentrated industries earned higher profits than those in more 
competitively structured industries.  Second, echoing a theme from Louis Brandeis, the 
structuralists rejected the notion that large aggregations of capital were necessary to achieving 
economies of scale.  While economies of scale did exist, in many markets the firms were far 
larger than minimum efficient scale demanded; such markets could be “deconcentrated” by 
breaking up large firms without causing significant production inefficiencies.  Third, the 
structuralists claimed that barriers to entry were high in many industries, but particularly in 
those with a large fixed cost component.  The Harvard School’s broad definition of entry 
barriers would raise a strong challenge from the Chicago School, which gave a much narrower 
definition to entry barriers—with the implication that far fewer markets would considered 
difficult to enter. Fourth, Kaysen-Turner argued that, given the close link between Cournot 
theory and maximizing behavior, poor performance in highly concentrated markets was 
inevitable.  As a result, antitrust should focus on structure and pay relatively less attention 
to conduct.   
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the antitrust laws.20  Johnson intended to use the report as part of his reelection 
campaign, but eventually decided not to seek reelection because of the 
unpopularity of the Vietnam War.21  Nonetheless, the Commission concluded its 
work and released its report.  The Report represented the high water mark of 
structuralist thinking.  It proposed a Concentrated Industries Act that would 
give the Attorney General a mandate to “search out” oligopolies and order 
divestiture to the point that no firm would end up with a market share exceeding 
12 percent.  It also proposed a much stronger structuralist presumption in 
horizontal merger cases, condemning any merger in which the four-firm 
concentration ratio exceeded 50 percent and one of the firms involved in the 
merger had a market share exceeding 10 percent. 
None of the Report’s recommendations was adopted into law.  Not only did 
Richard Nixon’s election kill off its immediate political prospects, but by the early 
1970s the Chicago School was rapidly eroding structuralism’s theoretical and 
empirical assumptions.  In the 1970s, Turner underwent a self-described 
“conversion experience” in which he accepted many of the Chicago School 
critiques of the SCP paradigm.22  Vestiges of structuralist thinking appeared as 
late as 1979 when Jimmy Carter’s National Commission to Review Antitrust Law 
and Procedures recommended adoption of a no-fault monopolization statute and 
in various iterations of the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission’s 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, but the S-C-P paradigm had long since been 
intellectually and politically vanquished.  The Harvard School that undergirded 
the anti-merger regime of the 1950s and 60s morphed into a neo-Harvard School 
that focused on institutionalism rather than structuralism.23 
Structuralism’s claims were distinct from the anti-totalitarian claims of 
Celler and Kefauver.  S-C-P was a “purely descriptive economic theory,” if such 
a thing exists. All of Chicago’s empirical and theoretical refutations of S-C-P 
could have been well taken without touching the separate Celler-Kefauver claim 
that an aggressive industrial deconcentration regime was necessary to prevent 
the consolidation of political power and erosion of democracy.  Nonetheless, the 
temporal coincidence and prescriptive alignment of the political and economic 
theories contributed to the demise of the political theory when the economic 
theory fell.  Merger policy in the 1970s concerned the predictive power of the S-
C-P’s models; once those models were discredited, Celler-Kefauver’s political 
project largely ended too without separate examination. 
B. Fascism and European Ordoliberalism 
 
The fate of the anti-fascist strand of American antitrust law can be 
contrasted with another post-War, anti-fascist antitrust ideology that has had a 
                                              
20  Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust & A Reprint of 
the Neal Report, 5 Comp. Pol’y Intl’l 217 (2009). 
21  Id. 
22  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:  PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 37 (2005). 
23 William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm 
Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2007). 
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much longer political run—the ordoliberalism of the Freiburg School that 
continues to exert influence in the European Union.  Ordoliberalism has its roots 
in pre-War Germany largely as a reaction to the failure of the Weimar state and 
the rise of Nazism.24  Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken, and Hans Grossmann-Doerth, 
professors at Freiburg, penned their Ordo Manifesto in 1936 amid the rise of 
National Socialism and were elevated to prominence during the Allied 
reconstruction of Germany.25   
Methodologically, the Ordoliberals lamented the compartmentalization of 
academic disciplines, particularly economics.  According to Eucken, “during the 
nineteenth century economic thought gradually had become isolated, and 
economists had lost sight of both the political and social contexts of economic 
issues.”26  As a result, the liberal tradition had become narrowly associated with 
laissez faire political ideology.  The Ordoliberals sought to promote moralistic 
and humane values by fusing economic and legal understanding into a 
comprehensive account of a just and liberal social order. 
Competition entered the Ordoliberal framework not merely as 
instrumental to achieving consumer or social welfare, but as a fundamental 
requirement of social justice and a well-functioning democratic society.  Free 
economic participation by all citizens was the primary channel for achieving 
liberal and humane values.  Market power by individuals or firms stood in the 
way of this goal.  According to the Ordoliberalsm, “[t]he problems of Weimar 
and Nazi Germany were attributable in part to the inability of the legal system 
to control and, if necessary, to disperse private economic power.”27  Accordingly, 
the state had an affirmative obligation to promote market competition in order 
to secure liberal goals. 
A major point of difference between Ordoliberalism and mainstream Anglo-
American traditions is that the Freiburg School conceived of competition 
principles as bedrock constitutional principles operating on both the state and 
private actors.  Although the U.S. Supreme Court has described the Sherman 
Act as the “magna carta of free enterprise,”28 the U.S. antitrust laws have never 
been understood as constitutional in any meaningful sense.  The government 
has no affirmative obligation to protect any private firm or individual from 
monopolistic oppression.  It may and frequently does exempt large actors from 
antitrust scrutiny and, more generally, make judgments about what degrees of 
market power are tolerable or intolerable insofar as they promote or retard 
efficiency. 
By contrast, the Ordoliberals understood the promotion of individual 
economic freedom as a core obligation of the state.  Freedom, in this 
lexicography, meant the absence of arbitrary control by private actors.  Even if 
                                              
24 David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and 
the “New” Europe, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 25, (1994). 
25 Crane & HOVENKAMP, SUPRA N. XXX; VOLKER R. BERGHAHN, THE AMERICANIZATION OF WEST GERMAN 
INDUSTRY 1945-1973 at 84-110 (1986). 
26  Id. at 237. 
27 RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 20 (5th ed. 2003); 
28  U.S. v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
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concentrations of market power could advance economic efficiency, the 
government could not permit such concentrations without compromising the 
liberal interest in personal freedom.  As Böhm explained, “[i]f we want freedom, 
we have no option but to sacrifice some advantage which we could obtain only 
by employing concentrated power.”29 
Ordoliberalism resonated with Brandeisian atomistic competition values 
and the belief in antitrust law as creating a level playing field and economic 
opportunity.  Consistent with the earlier observation that antitrust has 
historically drawn support from both right and left, the Ordoliberal tradition 
resonated with some on the populist-libertarian right like Friedrich von Hayek 
who maintained close intellectual connections to the Freiburg School and made 
frequent contributions to the ORDO journal.30   
Partly owing to its lineage as an anti-Nazi ideology and its proponents’ 
anti-Nazi credentials, Ordoliberalism grew in favor during the post-War era.  
With West Germany’s meteoric economic growth paralleling the rise of European 
integration and the creation of European-wide antitrust principles, 
Ordoliberalism was poised to become an important—perhaps the dominant—
European antitrust ideology.  Comparativists often explain divergences between 
U.S. and EU antitrust law in recent decades as founded on Europe’s Ordoliberal 
commitments that have no analogue in contemporary U.S. antitrust ideology.31 
Ordoliberalism, like Celler-Kefauver anti-concentrationism, linked 
industrial pluralism with political pluralism and owed its ascent to the demise 
of mid-century fascism.  Why, then, did Ordoliberalism survive as an antitrust 
ideology in Europe long after anti-fascism faded as an antitrust ideology in the 
United States?  The lines of influence are many and complex, but an important 
differentiating factor was that Ordoliberalism never became conceptually and 
politically comingled with a “purely economic” theory of concentration and 
oligopoly, as occurred with respect to the Celler-Kefauver legacy in the United 
States.  Ordoliberalism remained a moral theory of coercion and restraint that 
recognized the possible efficiency costs of a deconcentrated economy and 
demanded it nonetheless in light of recent European experience.  Hence, when 
the assault on economic structuralism arrived in the 1970s, European 
Ordoliberalism did not find its fundamental claims threatened. 
In recent years, the European Commission has stated a goal of moving 
away from a “form-based” approach to an “effects-based” approach to 
competition law issues, which is widely seen as throwing down the gauntlet to 
Ordoliberalism.32  This is occurring at a time when the economics profession has 
moved somewhat away from the more laissez faire prescriptions of the Chicago 
School, so the implications for European antitrust law are not as liberalizing as 
the Chicago assault on structuralism in the 1970s.  Still, this shift, if ultimately 
                                              
29 Crane & Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx. 
30 Id. 
31 See generally Silvia Beltrametti, Capturing the Transplant: U.S.  Antitrust Law in the European 
Union, 48 Vand. J. Trans. L. 1147 (2015). 
32 Pierre Larouche, The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy: Comment 
on Ahlborn and Evans, 75 Antitrust L. J. 933, 962 (2009). 
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endorsed by other elite European institutions (particularly the General Court 
and Court of Justice) could bring to a close the post-War European experiment 
with antitrust as an explicitly democracy and pluralism-reinforcing institution.  
Unless, that is, the anti-monopoly political currents flowing in the United States 
find their way across the Atlantic. 
II. A CASE STUDY FROM THE I.G. FARBEN CHEMICAL CARTEL 
 
As noted in the previous Section, the post-War currents of democracy-
enhancing antitrust ideology arose in the United States and Europe in reaction 
to the role that concentrated economic power played in stimulating the rise of 
fascism. To the extent that claims about the importance of particular forms of 
antitrust enforcement are predicated on cautionary tales about the associations 
of industrial and political power concentrations, it is important to inquire into 
the specifics of that relationship.  In particular: (1) by what mechanisms does 
industrial concentration facilitate the rise of political concentration; (2) is the 
problem “a curse of bigness” or market power more technically; and (3) what 
species of antitrust enforcement would be sufficient to counteract such effects? 
The relationship between Nazism and German industrial concentration 
provides ample source material from which to address these questions—in the 
particular case of fascism at least.  Among the German firms most important to 
the rise of Nazism and the perpetuation of its atrocities—a list that would have 
to include the Krupp armaments company, the Siemens railroad and 
infrastructure concern, and the Thyssen mining and steel business—none was 
more significant than the I.G. Farben chemical cartel.33  A 1945 “Report on the 
Investigation of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.” by the U.S. Office of Military 
Government concluded that Farben, although “nominally a private business 
enterprise” was “in fact a colossal empire serving the German State as one of the 
principal industrial cores around which successive German drives for world 
conquest have been organized” and served as “a trump . . . that almost enabled 
Hitler and Goering to extinguish the flame of freedom and human decency 
everywhere.”34  How did Farben come to play this villainous role, and what 
manner of antitrust regime might have prevented it? 
A. How I.G. Farben Empowered Hitler’s Rise to Power and the Nazi War 
Machine 
 
Ironically, for all of the headaches it would eventually induce, the story of 
I.G. Farben’s rise to power begins with a growing German chemical company—
Bayer—that introduced the world to aspirin in 1899.35  Inspired by the American 
                                              
33 See Diarmuid Jeffreys, HELL’S CARTEL: IG FARBEN AND THE MAKING OF HITLER’S WAR MACHINE 249 
(2008) (describing I.G. Farben’s singular importance to the Nazi regime). 
34 Office of Military Government, U.S. (Germany), Division of Investigation of Cartels and External 
Assets, Report on the Investigation of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. (November 1945), at 5, available 
at http://www.profit-over-life.org/books/books.php?book=30 (hereinafter “Military 
Government Report”). 
35 Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 38.  The I.G. Farben story has been extensively studied by scholars.  
The leading works include Diarmuid Jeffreys, HELL’S CARTEL: IG FARBEN AND THE MAKING OF 
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trusts of the Gilded Age, which were just beginning to receive serious antitrust 
scrutiny, Bayer entered into a pooling arrangement with two other chemical 
companies—BASF and Agfa in 1904.36  A rival chemical pool, headed by the 
Hoechst firm and including six German chemical companies, formed in the same 
year.37  The two rival pools operated as conventional cartels, including 
coordination on pricing, research and development, investment decisions, 
market allocations, and entry into foreign markets.38 
In 1916, with the British making inroads at the Somme, the two pools began 
to fret about the advent of foreign competition following the war.39  These 
anxieties resulted in a combination of the two trusts into a single mega-trust or 
profit-sharing pool, with the power to enable industry-wide coordination with 
respect to pricing, research and development, patent strategies, legal affairs, and 
insurance.40 The cartel structure persisted until 1925, when the pool’s nine 
members underwent a final corporate integration, merging into a single 
corporate entity (albeit with a complex structure of subsidiaries and holdings).41  
Thereafter, until its dissolution in the post-War era, Farben no longer operated 
as a “chemical cartel” as it is often styled in the literature.  In modern legal and 
economic terms, it was an integrated, widely held corporation, with 140,000 
shareholders.42 
After the great merger of 1925, Farben continued to extend its control over 
the German chemical industry and adjacent sectors with importance to 
Germany’s re-armament project.  A series of 1926 agreements ceded control over 
the German explosives industry to Farben.43  But it was a 1930 market division 
agreement with the American company Standard Oil of New Jersey, or Esso, that 
garnered the most critical attention after the commencement of hostilities. 
In the convention of the times, Farben had long engaged in global market 
division agreements with foreign rivals.  A 1923 agreement with the American 
firm Winthrop Chemical’s Sterling unit had allocated to Sterling the right to 
market aspirin in the United States, some of the Commonwealth countries, and 
South America, and to Farben the rest of the globe.44  In 1925, Farben initiated 
similar discussions with Standard Oil, these on the question of synthetic fuel.45  
After a five-year courtship, the negotiations resulted in the creation of the Joint 
American Study Company (“JASCO”), a research and development joint venture 
that also involved allocation of global markets for hydrogenated fuel.46  
 Since Farben’s exclusive area was limited to Germany, the fuel market-
                                              
HITLER’S WAR MACHINE (2008); Stephan H. Lindner, INSIDE IG FARBEN: HOECHST DURING THE 
THIRD REICH (2008); Peter Hayes, INDUSTRY AND IDEOLOGY: IG FARBEN IN THE NAZI ERA (1987); 
Joseph Borkin, THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF I.G. FARBEN: THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE BETWEEN 
HITLER AND THE GREAT CHEMICAL COMBINE (1978). 
36 Id. at 46. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 45-46. 
39 Id. at 77. 
40 Id. at 77. 
41 Id. at 118-22. 
42 Id. at 121-22; Military Government Report at 41. 
43 Military Government Report at 32. 
44 Id. at 107. 
45 Id. at 137; see generally Borkin, supra n. xxx at 76-90. 
46 Id. at 140. 
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division agreement turned out to be relatively unimportant to subsequent war 
efforts.  But a separate agreement turned out to be hugely damaging to U.S. 
interests. In addition to fuel, a form of synthetic rubber called buna can be 
extracted from coal.  The parties enlarged the JASCO agreement to include joint 
research and development related to buna.  Under the terms of the agreement, 
Standard Oil was obliged to assign to Farben any patents and know-how related 
to buna production.47  Farben had no reciprocal obligation, although, in 1930, 
the parties had anticipated some sort of collaboration on the marketing of 
buna.48  However, as Germany remilitarized, Farben became integrated into the 
Wehrmacht, and buna became strategically important to military mobilizations, 
Farben began to drag its feet on sharing any proprietary information with 
Standard Oil.49  Other American manufacturers interested in manufacturing 
synthetic rubber, such as  Goodyear Rubber Company and Dow Chemical, 
unsuccessfully sought a patent license from Standard Oil, which stalled them 
on a licensing arrangement due to being stalled themselves by Farben.50  The 
JASCO arrangement had the effect of delaying American development of buna 
by a number of years.  
After Pearl Harbor and the commencement of the war in the Pacific, American 
access to rubber supplies from Southeast Asia faltered and access to synthetic 
rubber became critical.51  Due to Farben’s cooption of Standard Oil under the 
JASCO agreement, American scientists were far behind in developing their own 
way of producing buna, and it took an immense expenditure of time and effort 
to catch up to the Germans.52 The U.S. War Department considered that the 
cooption of Standard’s buna research efforts by Farben “seriously imperiled the 
war preparations of the United States.”53  So did the United States Justice 
Department, which indicted and convicted Standard Oil, six subsdiaries, and 
four executives on charges of criminally conspiring with Farben to restrict trade 
in synthetic fuel and buna.54 
With Hitler’s rise to power in the early 1930s, Farben initially resisted 
Nazification, worried about potential ill effects on its global business of becoming 
overly intertwined with a controversial political party.55  However, by the mid-
1930s, the firm’s management had acceded to the reality that alliance with the 
Nazis was critical to the continued success of the Farben enterprise.  The firm 
purged its Jewish managers, began making financial contributions to Hitler’s 
slush fund, and began to align politically with the Nazis.56  By 1935-36, as 
Hitler’s rearmament project intensified, the firm become organizationally 
                                              
47 Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 236; Hayes, supra n. xxx at 38. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 236-237; Borkin, supra n. xxx at 80-90.  In 1939, Standard and Farben re-worked the 
JASCO agreement, including an assignment of the U.S. patent rights to buna to Standard.  
Hayes, supra n. xxx at 335.  However, the German government insisted that Farben share 
none of its know-how on buna production with Standard.  Id. at 336; Borkin, supra n. xxx at 
87. 
50 Borkin, supra n. xxx at 81. 
51 Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 273. 
52 Id. at 273. 
53 War Department Report, at 81. 
54 Jeffreys at 273. 
55 Id. at 143-172. 
56 Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 170. 
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intermeshed with the Wehrmacht.57 From then until the end of the War, Farben 
effectively served as an industrial branch of the Nazi regime, with profits 
continuing to flow to the firm’s managers and shareholders. 
The rewards to the Nazi alliance paid off handsomely. By the late 1930s, 
Farben controlled almost all German chemical and synthetic production, 
including 100% of synthetic rubber, 100% of lubricating oils, 100% of serums, 
90% of plastics, 88% of magnesium, 64% of explosives, and 75% of nitrogen.58  
Even during the economic downturn of the Great Depression, Farben continued 
to earn handsome profits.59 
Following the Austrian Anschluss of 1938 and the German invasion of much 
of Europe beginning the following year, Farben gobbled up the chemical 
industries in the conquered territories, annexing them into the Farben empire.60  
Farben effectively served as the prime economic arm of Germany’s European 
conquests, coercing firms in conquered territories to sell cheaply or simply taking 
them over. Tragically, Farben also served as one of the many faces of Third Reich 
evil, running a factory concentration camp at Auschwitz and supplying the 
Zyklon B gas used to exterminate Jews and other prisoners.61 
After German capitulation in 1945, Farben fell under the control of the 
occupying forces.  Convinced that Farben’s global network of subsidiaries and 
interests remained a threat to the free world, the U.S. occupying forces set out 
immediately to dismantle the company.62  In 1947, 24 Farben executives were 
tried for war crimes at Nuremberg, with nine defendants ultimately found guilty 
of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity through the plunder of 
public and private property in territories that came under German occupation 
and five found guilty of enslavement and deportation for slave labor of civilians.63  
In 1952, Farben was split into three large companies—Bayer, Hoechst, and 
BASF—and six smaller firms.64  The pre-1904 market was largely recreated, with 
substantial adjustments for the passage of time. As of this writing, Bayer is again 
making antitrust headlines, now because of its proposed merger with 
Monsanto.65 
B. Did Monopoly Enable Nazism? 
 
Farben played a significant—perhaps indispensable—role in Hitler’s rise to 
power, in Germany’s wars of aggression, and in the evils perpetrated by the Nazi 
regime.  But it does not necessarily follow that Farben’s monopolistic position in 
the German chemical industry is causally related to the rise of fascism—or that 
monopoly enabled Nazism.  Two matters should give us pause before making 
such an inference. 
                                              
57 Military Government Report at 57. 
58 Military Government Report at 33; see also Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 124. 
59 Military Government Report at 35. 
60 Military Government Report, at 94-122; Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 242-43. 
61 Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 306. 
62 Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 354-58. 
63 Id. at 378-402. 
64 Id. at 403. 
65 Natalia Drozdiak & Jacob Bunge,  ‘Serious Doubts’ Over Bayer and Monsanto’s $57 Billion 
Megadeal, Says EU, Wall Street Journal (Aug. 22, 2017). 
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First, the direction of causation requires further specification.  Did 
preexisting monopoly conditions in the German chemical industry (and other 
industries) precipitate the rise of Nazism, or did ascendant Nazism promote 
monopoly? In other words, was monopoly a cause or symptom of German 
fascism?  If it was a symptom rather than cause, that might still be a salient data 
point in the current conversation over monopoly and democracy, since the 
presence of monopoly conditions could serve as a canary in the coal mine for the 
decline of democratic conditions.  But the implications for antitrust enforcement 
might differ. 
Second, Farben’s chemical monopoly could have facilitated the German war 
effort without necessarily facilitating fascism per se.  The Farben executives tried 
at Nuremberg vigorously objected that they had acted only as patriotic 
businessmen serving their country during wartime, just as their counterparts 
did in Allied territory.66  Though gigantic, Farben remained smaller than three 
American industrial concerns—General Motors, U.S. Steel, and Standard Oil.67  
Nor was Farben’s wartime market power exceptional. During both World Wars, 
the United States largely suspended the antitrust laws in war-critical industries 
in order to mobilize economically and militarily.68  During the First World War, 
the federal government relaxed antitrust enforcement to permit competitor 
collaborations and suspended pending antitrust cases against United States 
Steel, Eastman Kodak, American Can, and International Harvester.69  President 
Wilson opined that “to vindicate the [antitrust] law, [it] would disorganize 
industry.”70  During the Second World War, the Roosevelt administration issued 
grants of formal immunization to permit otherwise anticompetitive activities 
supporting the war effort, allowed small firms to pool resources, allowed the 
Secretaries of War and Navy a veto over antitrust prosecutions, and tolled over 
thirty antitrust cases.71  Even the previously mentioned prosecution of Standard 
Oil for its participation in the JASCO debacle was ordered tolled at the instance 
of the War Department in order to allow Standard to focus on the war effort.72 
That the U.S. government viewed some degree of enhanced industrial 
concentration and collaboration as critical to the war effort suggests that such 
relaxation of competition norms and increases in market power may be endemic 
to war efforts in general, whether in the service of democracy or its regrettable 
alternatives. 
Despite these potential objections, the claim asserted around the passage of 
the Celler-Kefauver Amendments—that the preexisting concentration of critical 
German industries facilitated and spurred the rise of Nazism—seems historically 
credible.  Farben’s chemical monopoly did not come about as a facet of national 
                                              
66 Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 394. 
67 Jeffreys, supra n. xxx at 9. 
68 Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile, Antitrust in Wartime, 16-SPG Antitrust 71 (2002); Thomas 
K. Fisher, Antitrust During National Emergencies, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 969 (1942). 
69 Id. at 72. 
70 Fisher, supra  n. xxx at 996. 
71 Steuer & Barile, supra n. xxx at 72-73. 
72 Standard declined the Government’s tolling suggestion, preferring to resolve the case 
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industrial policy during wartime.  Rather, the cartel preceded World War I by a 
decade and the merger-to-monopoly preceded the Second World War by fifteen 
years.  If industrial coordination and concentration are necessary to military 
mobilization, then Farben’s industrial conquests had laid the ground work for 
the rise of a militaristic regime long before the commencement of hostilities.  
Years before hostilities began, Farben had become fully engaged in the process 
of “creating an infrastructure that would allow it to respond directly to the 
government’s demands for strategic autarky—in effect, taking a leading role in 
getting Germany ready for war.”73 With tremendous economic power over war-
sensitive industries, Farben was willing and able to spur German rearmament 
and propel it into wars of aggression—the “military-industrial complex” of which 
President Eisenhower would warn in his valedictory address decades later.74 
Moreover, the historical record suggests that the presence of a highly 
concentrated industrial sector facilitated Hitler’s rapid consolidation of political 
control in Germany during the mid-1930s. During the years of his march from 
a failed putsch leader of a fringe party to totalitarian dictator, Hitler needed the 
material support of dominant institutions with organizational structures 
permeating German society. He could not rely initially on the Government, which 
was politically fractured and unstable, nor the Catholic Church, which was 
externally controlled and largely ideologically opposed.  Even the army had to be 
gradually courted, then radically reorganized into the Wehrmacht, in order to 
consolidate Nazi control.  By contrast, monopoly business firms were ideally 
positioned to facilitate the rapid consolidation of political power.  Once Farben’s 
senior managers had made a bet that alliance with Hitler was critical to the firm’s 
long-run profitability (particularly given the immense commercial benefits that 
would come to a chemical monopoly from a program of rearmament and 
industrial-military independence), they effectively put the firm and its resources 
at Hitler’s disposal—with the understanding, of course, that the firm would be 
allowed to cash in financially by serving as a military-economic arm of the state.  
Thus developed a co-dependent relationship between the firm and the regime. 
For example, Farben played an early and critical role in developing the 
finances of the Nazi party.  On February 27, 1933—perhaps not coincidentally 
the day of the Reichstag fire—Farben deposited RM 400,000 in the Nazi Party’s 
coffers, the largest donation by any firm by a large order of magnitude.75  A 
succession of further donations followed, providing Hitler with a constant source 
of extra-governmental funding even while he struggled to consolidate his power 
over the state.  The firm also played a significant role as an incubator and 
disseminator of Nazi propaganda. Farben employed 120,000 people,76 and 
owned a number of newspapers,77 which allowed the firm to spread Nazi 
propaganda in Germany and around the world.78 
There is also evidence that the symbiotic relationship between firm and 
regime resulted in a loss of checks and balances—of democratic features—within 
the Farben organization itself.  In 1937-38, as Farben was becoming increasingly 
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an arm of the regime, the company reorganized to centralize power in a few senior 
managers: 46 once distinct subsidiaries were absorbed into the main enterprise, 
the number of managing and supervising board members was reduced, the 
governing powers of the firm’s Central Committee were largely transferred to the 
company’s president, company minutes and records ceased to be widely 
circulated, and board members were denied access to financial reports.79  In 
short, the firm organizationally replicated many of the democracy-quashing 
changes occurring in the political regime, with the effect of extending totalitarian 
control from the political to the business realm. 
To be sure, some of these democracy-eroding effects were products of large 
organizational structure rather than market power in an antitrust sense—a 
distinction drawn in the introduction and explored further below.  Still, the 
historical record suggests that it was not just Farben’s size, but its economic 
dominance in the chemical sector, that made it such a convenient vehicle for the 
rise of Nazism.  What Hitler needed in 1933 was a firm with ample cash to 
bankroll his political regime extra-governmentally, an organizational structure 
spread throughout German society, and the economic power to drive an entire 
industry at a dictator’s direction. Abnormal financial resources, ubiquitous local 
presence, and—in particular—the power to direct an entire industry, are 
attributes of monopoly.  In 1933, Farben possessed all of these in droves due to 
a course of economic concentration dating back to the turn of the century. 
C. Could an Economically Oriented Antitrust Regime Could Have Prevented 
Farben’s Tragic Role in Facilitating Nazism? 
 
The historical record of the Farben chemical cartel lends credence to the 
claim that concentrated economic power fuels concentrated political power, with 
corrosive effects for democracy.  But does it follow that an antitrust regime 
explicitly focused on political values is necessary to the preservation of 
democracy, or would an antitrust regime focused on economic values such as 
preserving allocative efficiency and maximizing consumer welfare serve the same 
function?  Some initial data relevant to answering these questions can be 
gathered by subjecting the Farben story to a counterfactual inquiry that 
imagines the German economy constrained by contemporary economically 
oriented antitrust norms.  Would the presence of a consumer welfare oriented 
antitrust law have prevented the economic dominance of I.G. Farben and hence 
the crucial role it played in supporting the rise and evils of Nazism?  The answer 
is plainly yes.  Prior to reconstruction under the Allies, Germany had no antitrust 
law—at least none that would be recognizable under contemporary global 
standards.80 If it had, Farben could not have risen to dominance in the manner 
it did.  Nor could it likely have found another way to monopolize the German 
chemical market. 
Farben’s path to monopoly consisted of five steps: (1) domestic cartelization; 
(2) domestic merger to monopoly; (3) international market division; (4) 
integration with the state; and (5) foreign industrial conquest through economic 
and military coercion.  The first three steps were accomplished prior to the rise 
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of the Nazi regime, and put in place the economic and institutional arrangements 
that Hitler would seize upon in his navigation to power.  The second two steps, 
mediated by the Nazi regime, consolidated and expanded Farben’s preexisting 
power. 
The first three steps present relatively straightforward cases for 
condemnation under economically oriented antitrust norms.  Naked cartel 
agreements, including the two 1904 pooling arrangements, the 1916 mega-pool, 
and the 1926 explosives agreement, are considered per se illegal under 
contemporary antitrust doctrine.81 The Justice Department vigorously 
prosecutes them criminally, yielding billions of dollars in fines and hundreds of 
years in prison terms.82  If contemporary antitrust norms had applied to early 
twentieth century Germany, the chemical cartel could not lawfully have 
occurred. 
Similarly, the 1925 merger to monopoly would almost certainly have been 
disallowed under consumer welfare oriented antitrust norms.  Although mergers, 
unlike cartels, are judged under a rule of reason standard rather than a per se 
rule of illegality, a merger between the nine largest chemical companies in the 
country, resulting in a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index figure of a perfect 10,000 in 
many sectors, would almost certainly be prohibited.83  
The international market division agreement with Standard Oil presents a 
somewhat closer case than the domestic cartel agreements and merger to 
monopoly. Though it involved market division, JASCO nominally advanced two 
interests recognized as generally procompetitive under contemporary antitrust 
norms: (1) licensing contested patent rights; and (2) pooling economic and 
technical resources for joint research and development activities.84 Despite these 
facially procompetitive effects, the JASCO arrangement would likely fail under 
contemporary antitrust norms—as it did when challenged by the Justice 
Department in 1942.  The sweeping global market division accomplished by the 
JASCO agreements—allocating entire product segments and the entire globe—
quite plainly exceeded the scope of any relevant patent rights, and hence would 
be considered per se illegal market division under prevailing contemporary 
norms.85  Moreover, the “joint research” functions of JASCO apparently did not 
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involve much genuine pooling of technical resources by the two companies, as 
evidenced by the fact that Standard’s scientists and engineers were unable to 
replicate the production of buna without Farben’s help until, after the 
termination of the agreement, they effectively reinvented the wheel.86  The “joint 
study” arrangement seems to have operated principally as an allocation of buna 
research and market exploitation to Farben, with a loose expectation that Farben 
might later enable Standard to enter the field as well.87  Such an arrangement 
would also be considered unlawful market division under contemporary 
antitrust norms, as it was in 1942.88 
The last two steps—integration with the state and foreign conquest—
permitted Farben to consolidate and enlarge its preexisting monopoly power 
under the Third Reich.  Contemporary antitrust norms would not likely have 
been availing to curb these abuses, but not due to antitrust’s contemporary 
economic or consumer welfare orientation. Direct state involvement in the 
creation of monopoly power generally renders the scheme untouchable under 
the antitrust laws not out of solicitude to consumer welfare or efficiency but 
because of political commitments to federalism and democratic processes.89 
Indeed, it has largely been advocates of the consumer welfare approach that have 
argued for narrowing state action immunity on the view that states 
systematically distort competitive processes for the benefit of rent-seekers.90 As 
to economic conquests during the war, this facet of Farben’s malfeasance is quite 
obviously beyond the possible scope of any domestic antitrust law.  This is not 
to say that it is untouchable by law more generally. Nine of the Farben 
defendants were convicted at Nuremberg on the charges of plundering and 
spoliation of public and private property, and expropriation of property during 
war remains a serious crime under the Hague Convention.91 
In sum, application of contemporary economically oriented antitrust 
principles could have prevented Farben’s rise to dominance in Germany, and 
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hence the exploitation of Farben’s monopoly to facilitate Hitler’s rise to power.  
Once the firm and state were organizationally intermeshed and part of a single, 
lawless program of domestic and international conquest and control, no form of 
antitrust law—nor any other domestic law—realistically could have arrested 
their brutal trajectory. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Concerns that industrial monopoly undermines democracy are not new.  
Most recently in Western history, such concerns obtained political traction in 
the wake of the Second World War, to the point that anti-fascism served as a 
dominant motivation underling the post-War antitrust regimes in both the 
United States and Europe.  With the ascendancy of calls for a reinvigorated 
antitrust regime in service of democracy, it is important to recall the similar 
conversation that took place in light of fascism’s existential threat to the 
democratic order. 
The framers of the post-War antitrust regimes in the Europe and the United 
States were convinced that a strong anti-monopoly norm was necessary to 
preventing the reemergence of the sort of consolidated economic power that 
threatened democratic liberalism. This Article has presented historical evidence 
substantiating that concern—demonstrating that I.G. Farben’s rise from a loose 
chemical cartel to an industrial juggernaut facilitated Hitler’s rise to power and 
wars of aggression and the atrocities of the Nazi regime.  The particulars of the 
Farben story also have potential implications for the formulation of democracy-
reinforcing antitrust law.  At least as to the German chemical industry, 
application of consumer-welfare-oriented antitrust principles would have 
interdicted the steps leading to the Farben monopoly and hence its role as 
Hitler’s industrial facilitator.  If the Farben story can be generalized—an 
important caveat since this is just the beginning of an inquiry—that would 
suggest that antitrust law need not be reformulated to safeguard political 
liberalism, that what is good for consumers is good for democracy. 
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